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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On appeal, Mr. Moore asserted that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his request to have the district court remove his 2003 Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) and attached Psychosexual Evaluation 
(hereinafter, PSE) from the possession of the Idaho Department of Corrections 
(hereinafter, IDOC) to prevent its further use by the parole board in determining whether 
Mr. Moore will be paroled at the conclusion of the fixed portion of his sentence and his 
programming requirements while incarcerated. The instant Reply Brief is necessary to 
respond to the State's assertions that Mr. Moore did not challenge all of the grounds for 
the district court's ruling and that Mr. Moore somehow waived his ability to challenge the 
use of the PSE by the IDOC. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Moore's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Moore's motion to remove the 2003 PSI from 
the possession of the IDOC?' 
On appeal, Mr. Moore also challenged the excessiveness of his sentence as imposed 
by the district court. Although that issue is not addressed herein, Mr. Moore continues 
to assert that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence 
upon him. 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denvinq Mr. Moore's Motion To Remove His 
2003 PSI From The IDOC Because The District Court Failed To Recoqnize It Had 
Discretion To Require The IDOC To Relinquish Possession Of The PSI 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred by denying Mr. Moore's motion to remove his 2003 PSI 
and the attached psychosexual evaluation from the IDOC. The district court abused its 
discretion because it failed to recognize that it had any discretion to remove the report 
from the IDOC. Mr. Moore requests that this matter be remanded to the district court 
with instructions that the IDOC return Mr. Moore's 2003 PSI to the district court. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denyinq Mr. Moore's Motion To 
Remove His 2003 PSI From The IDOC Because The District Court Failed To 
Recognize It Had Discretion To Require The IDOC To Relinquish Possession Of 
The PSI 
1. Mr. Moore Properlv Challenged The District Court's Basis For Its Decision 
To Deny Mr. Moore's Request To Remove His 2003 PSI From The IDOC 
In its briefing, the State has argued that "the record shows that Moore has not 
challenged the district court's alternative basis for its ruling. . . ." (Respondent's Brief, 
p.5.) The State then cited to only a portion of the district court's "alternative basis" for its 
decision and represented that the district court found that there "is no underlying Fifth 
Amendment violation that would merit denying the Department of Correction access to 
information in the 2003 PSI or 2003 PSE already in the Department's possession." 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) However, a review of the district court's oral 
pronouncement, in its entirety, shows the State's argument to be meritless and a 
misrepresentation of the proceedings in the lower court. 
In denying Mr. Moore's motion to remove the 2003 PSI report from the IDOC, the 
district court stated: 
I don't know that the Court is really inclined to remove these reports 
from the file. First of all, I think the file is the file, and it needs to maintain 
integrity. If there is a subsequent appeal of the decision this Court makes, 
that file needs to remain intact. Now, I don't have a problem ordering the 
presentence report in this case. The old one is, in fact, sealed. As I've 
indicated, it's remained sealed and I didn't unseal it for purposes of 
consideration of sentencing today. 
The December 8th report of 2008, which is prepared, I can certainly 
direct that that also be sealed and not forwarded down to the Department 
of Corrections because that's not going to be part of the report that was 
considered for purposes of this disposition. So the Court can certainly 
direct the clerk to do that. 
Furthermore, I don't think I can order the Department of Corrections 
to do anything with the information that they already have. I'm not even 
sure I have the jurisdiction at this point in time to interfere with that. 
Perhaps some collateral action that Mr. Moore may want to bring so the 
Department of Corrections may not use that information inappropriately, 
but I don't think I can reach out and grab that information that was already 
distributed some five years or so ago to the Department of Corrections. 
Furthermore, the whole issue here in front of the Court, I believe, 
involves Mr. Moore's Fifth Amendment rights, and the presentence 
investigation contains a lot of information, some of which is totally and 
completely unrelated to the cr~tical issue that ultimately has resulted in this 
resentencing. So I don't feel that I'm inclined to do anything other than to 
make sure that we seal the presentence report, the first one that was done 
on the resentencing and that was the December 8th report, and we'll make 
sure that's sealed and is not forwarded to the Department of Corrections. . 
(3123109 Tr., p.12, L.2 - p.13, ~ .19. ) *  
* The italicized portion was the only part of the district court's oral pronouncement 
quoted by the State. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) 
Viewed in its entirety the district court's sole basis for its decision to deny 
Mr. Moore's motion was that it did not believe it had the authority to grant the motion 
and "felt" as though it could only order the newest PSI to be sealed. The district court, 
however, did not find "that there is no underlying Fifth Amendment violation that would 
merit denying the Department of Correction access'' to the 2003 PSI or 2003 PSE. (See 
Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) Rather, the Court found just the opposite, first identifying 
that the central issue was a violation of Mr. Moore's Fifth Amendment rights; then 
observing that the 2003 PSI "contains a lot of information" unrelated the critical issues, 
the Fifth Amendment violation, the resulted in resentencing. (3123109 Tr., p.12, L.2 - 
p. 13, L. 19.) Accordingly, the State's position is without merit. 
2. Mr. Moore Did Not Waive The Fifth Amendment Protections 
The United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the ldaho Supreme 
Court have all held that the Fifth Amendment protections apply to evaluations that 
potentially compel self-incriminatory information. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 
460 (1981) (holding that a criminal defendant who neither initiates a psychiatric exam, 
nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to 
a psychiatrist if statements he makes can be used against him during a capital 
sentencing proceeding); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999) (extending 
Estelle to non-capital cases.); United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128 (gth Cir. 2005) 
(holding that the revocation of probation and supervised release violated Antelope's 
Fifth Amendment protections when, as a condition of probation, probationer was 
required to submit to a psychosexual evaluation that required a full disclosure verified 
by polygraph examinations.); and State v. Wood, 132 ldaho 88, 967 P.2d 702 (1998) 
(holding that defense attorney's failure to object to the inclusion of a psychological 
evaluation in a presentence investigation report constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel). 
While the Fifth Amendment protections apply to psychosexual evaluations, to 
invoke the protections of the Fifth Amendment such that coerced statements must be 
suppressed, the defendant must either invoke the right and actually remain silent, or 
show that his failure to remain silent falls within one of the recognized exceptions for 
failing to remain silent. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984.) The first 
exception applies to witnesses who are interrogated while being held in police custody. 
Id. at 430. The second exception requires establishing: "1) that the testimony desired 
by the government carried the risk of incrimination . . . and 2) that the penalty he 
suffered amounted to compulsion." Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1134. The risk of 
incrimination must be "real and appreciable," but does not require that "the prosecutorial 
sword must actually strike or be poised to strike." Id. The compulsion prong inquiries 
"whether the government has sought to 'impose substantial penalties because a witness 
elects to exercise his fifth amendment right not to give incriminating testimony against 
himself."' Id. at 1 135 
The Ninth Circuit analyzed this issue in Antelope. In Antelope, the defendant 
was charged with a federal child pornography offense. Id. at 1131. Following his 
conviction, the court sentenced him to probation. Id. As a condition of probation, 
Mr. Antelope had to provide a full-disclosure sexual history. Id. Mr. Antelope raised a 
Fifth Amendment claim to undergoing a full sexual history disclosure as a condition of 
probation. Id. His claim was denied and while the appeal was pending, his probation 
was revoked for failing to comply with the sex offender treatment program component 
requiring the full disclosure. Id. Eventually, Mr. Antelope's probation was revoked and 
he was ordered to spend time in prison. Id. at 1132. After being released from 
incarceration, as a condition of release, Mr. Antelope was again ordered to participate in 
treatment, a component of which required a full disclosure of his sexual history. Id. 
Mr. Antelope requested treatment and a willingness to participate in treatment, but 
refused to participate in the polygraph or the sexual history disclosure. Id. His release 
was revoked and he was again incarcerated. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit discussed the two prong test articulated above and 
held that Mr. Antelope's risk of incrimination was "real and appreciable" because his 
ongoing steadfastness to refuse to comply created a likely inference that his disclosure 
would reveal other sexual offenses. Id. at 1135. This inference comported with the 
opinion of Mr. Antelope's counselor, who believed Mr. Antelope had committed other 
offenses. Id. Finally, the court noted that under state law, Mr. Antelope's counselor 
was required to report any disclosed sexual offenses, he had reported other client's 
offenses in the past, and those reports had led to other convictions. Id. The court 
succinctly summarized: 
Setting the privilege aside, Antelope would have to reveal past sex crimes 
to the SABER counselor; the counselor would likely report the incidents to 
the authorities, who could then use Antelope's admissions to prosecute 
and convict him of the additional crimes. Viewed in this light, very little 
stands between Antelope's participation in SABER and future prosecution. 
Id. 
In determining that Mr. Antelope was compelled to provide this incriminating 
testimony, the Ninth Circuit looked to United States Supreme Court analysis in a string 
of cases, and relied primarily on McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring in a 4-1-4 decision). Justice O'Connor's concurrence was the opinion relied 
upon by the Ninth Circuit because, when "no single rationale explaining the result 
enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds." Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1 133 citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1 977) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In McKune, supra, although the plurality found no compulsion, Justice O'Connor 
made clear that although: 
Lile's reduction in incentive level, and ... corresponding transfer from a 
medium-security to a maximum-security part of the prison' were not 
penalties 'sufficiently serious to compel his testimony, ... "she d[id] not 
agree with the suggestion in the plurality opinion that these penalties could 
permissibly rise to the level of . . . penalties [like] longer incarceration and 
execution [which] are far greater than those we have already held to 
constitute unconstitutional compulsion. 
Id. at 1137 (citing McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 50-52). And, when looking at the cases 
in which the United States Supreme Court has found compulsion, it appears that the 
Court would find that a longer period of incarceration would amount to compulsion. Id. 
The Court then held that the State could not "sanction Antelope for his self- 
protective silence about conduct that might constitute other crimes." Id. The Court 
noted that, "Even though the disclosures sought here may serve a valid rehabilitative 
purpose, they also may be starkly incriminating, and there is no disputing that the 
government may seek to use such disclosures for prosecutorial purposes." Id. 
After finding compulsion, the Court also found that the risk of incrimination for 
Mr. Antelope was "real and appreciable" because: 
Antelope has already suffered repeated revocation of his conditional 
liberty as a result of invoking his Fifth Amendment right. And, we have no 
doubt that Antelope's loss of liberty was as "substantial" a penalty as, if 
not more serious than, the ones imposed upon the litigants in the line of 
cases from Spevack to Cunningham - and totally unlike the mere transfer 
from one part of the prison to another, as in McKune. 
Id. at 11 39. 
In the case at bar, Mr. Moore did not assert his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against participating in the psychosexual evaluation, until he filed his petition seeking 
post conviction relief. However, he can establish that the testimony desired by the 
government carried the risk of incrimination . . . and that the penalty he suffered 
amounted to compulsion." Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1134. The compulsion prong inquiries 
"whether the government has sought to 'impose substantial penalties because a witness 
elects to exercise his fifth amendment right not to give incriminating testimony against 
himself."' Id. at 1 135 
On June 11, 2003, the court ordered that Mr. Moore complete a psychosexual 
evaluation to be conducted by Drs. Hearn and Timlin. (R.30096, pp.37-38.)3 Moreover, 
if ordered by the district court, I.C. § 18-8316 makes a psychosexual evaluation 
mandatory on the part of Mr. Moore. See §18-8316 ("If ordered by the court, an 
offender convicted of any offense listed in section 18-8304, ldaho Code, shall submit to 
an evaluation . . . for the court's consideration prior to sentencing and incarceration or 
release on probation.") Like in Antelope, had Mr. Moore revealed any other offenses, 
the psychosexual evaluator would have been required to disclose that to the police. 
See ldaho Code § 16-1619, requiring "[alny physician, resident on a hospital staff, 
intern, nurse, coroner, school teacher, day care personnel, social worker, or other 
person having reason to believe that a child under the age of eighteen (18) years has 
been abused," must report that abuse or face misdemeanor charges). Thus, any 
disclosures made by Mr. Moore would have been forwarded to the prosecutor, 
subjecting Mr. Moore to additional criminal charges. Thus, regardless of whether any 
charges were actually filed, as in Antelope, it is the risk of charges that satisfy the 
compulsion element. 
Additionally, the risk of incrimination was "real and appreciable" because his 
sentencing was already set for a certain date. Thus, because Mr. Moore established 
both the compulsion and actual incrimination he faced, he is entitled to invoke the 
protections of the Fifth Amendment, and be able to suppress the psychosexual 
evaluation in this case. Accordingly, Mr. Moore has sufficiently invoked the protections 
of the Fifth Amendment, such that this Court should conclude that the protections of the 
Fifth Amendment apply to psychosexual evaluations. 
Moreover, as is set forth in more detail in Mr. Moore's Appellant's Brief, a finding 
that Mr. Moore has waived his Fifth Amendment protections in the instant case 
seemingly makes the protections and decision in both Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 
149 P.3d 833 (2007) and State v. Rodriguez, 132 ldaho 261, 971 P.2d 327 (1998) 
illusory such that a party obtaining relief under Estrada would continued to be punished 
by the parole board failing to release him on parole for his counsel's failure to advise 
him of his protection against self incrimination. As such, Mr. Moore is given a right (the 
Mr. Moore has filed a Motion Requesting that this Court take judicial notice of its 
records in his two previous appeals leading to the instant case, S.C. Docket No. 30096 
and S.C. Docket No.32756. 
ability to file a post conviction action alleging ineffective assistance of counsel), without 
a complete remedy. See Coleman v. State, 114 Idaho 901, 902; 762 P.2d 814, 815 
(1988) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 97 S. Ct. 1491 (1977), "Perhaps the constitutional 
right most critical to prisoners is that of access to courts. Without access it is impossible 
for them to use the judicial system to vindicate other rights. Rights without remedies are 
often meaningless, and remedies without access to courts for their enforcement can be 
illusory.") 
Accordingly, Mr. Moore respectfully requests that this case be remanded to the 
district court with instructions that his 2003 PSI, and all of its contents (including the 
psychosexual evaluation), be removed from the possession of the IDOC. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Moore respectfully requests that this case be remanded to the district court 
with instructions that his 2003 PSI be removed from the possession of the IDOC. 
Additionally, Mr. Moore requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate. 
DATED this 28th day of June, 2010. 
I / 
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